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A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING PRODUCT
INNOVATION STRATEGIES IN A
COMPETITIVE CONTEXT

Patrick J. Rondeau and Bhal J. Bhatt

INTRODUCTION
The development of new products capable of satisfying customer demands on a
timely basis has become a priority for firms seeking to improve their competitive
advantage in a global context.
However, this challenge has become highly complex due to a growing diversity
of both products and processes, higher costs, and unprecedented considerations
for quality and service (Bolt, 1988). Despite knowing a great deal about both the
characteristics of successful firms and new product development processes, little
is known regarding requisite guidelines for successful strategies in product
development.
Kantrow (1980), among others, has identified market, customer, organizational,
and managerial characteristics of firms that have been successful in new product
development. Others have attempted to identify the product, manufacturing, and
information technologies that surround successful product development processes
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coordinator. Bhal J. Bhatt is Professor and Chair of the Department of Management
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(Morton,' 1983; Stoubaugh andTelesio, 1983; Wheelwright, 1984; Zirger and
Modesto, 1990). In bOth cases, the focus has been on describing the general activities
that firms have engaged in to improve product development success as well as overall

competitive advantage. '

~,

Hence, a critical need exists fora' framework to guide the creation of product
development strategies that is based upon an examination of the relationship between
product innovation and the 'competitive nature of technologies. We propose the
construction of such a fraIl1ework through an integration of Tushman and Nadler's
(1986) levels of innovation with Johnson's (1987) levels of technology to create
a 3X3 matrix of product innovatio"nltechnology positions. Within this framework,
the product development process is discussed and an innovation index is proposed
, by which a fiflnlmiy assess arid preposition product performance.

LITERATURE REVIEW.

lohne and Snelson (1989) have classified the development of new products in terms
of either old product development (OPD)'or new product development (NPD) efforts.
OPD is primarily concerned with protecting or extending the market share of existing
products through their redevelopment or revision to better fit current market demands.
NPD is concerned with the creation and development of totally new products that
define new markets or capture specific segments of existing markets not previously
addressed by a firm.
In a majority of cases, however, new products are essentially "spin-offs" of
pre-existing families of products and contain only minor improvements over their
predecessors. As such, relatively few new products may be classified as truly new
and revolutionary in nature. Furthermore, when comparing OPD versus NPD
processes, NPD processes will often carry a higher risk of failure than will OPD
. processes. This is primarily because OPO efforts are: (1) normally based upon
a successful line of existing products; and (2) often utilize proven technologies and
processes in which the firm has had extensive prior experience (Johne and Snelson,
1989).
A firm's initial reaction might be to embrace and exclusively pursue the apparent
safety 'of an OPO strategy. However, a long-term failure to pursue totally new
products might also prove disastrous if competitors were to succeed in their NPD
activities. A firm must therefore identify and achieve a proper balance between
its need to attain greater technical synergies with its need to produce truly new
and innovative products capable of defending or expanding market share (Link,
1987; Paul, 1987). This may require firms to simultaneous engage in the pursuit
of both NPO and OPD activities. Accordingly, a need for the subsequent development

ACR Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 5
of better methods for assessing and understanding the innovation/technology
relationship within and between firms clearly exists to enable the creation of more
effective long-term product development strategies.

LEVELS OF PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION

Tushman and Nadler (1986) describe product and process innovation as occurring
on one of three levels. The first is incremental innovation where added features,
new versions, or extensions to existing product lines are implemented in small steps.
While this often results in lower costs of product development and reduced risk,
it may also yield a lower return on investment (ROI) for the firm. However, when
managed well these smaller but more consistent product and process improvements
(i.e., learning curve effects) can add up to create significant gains by substantially
extending old product's lives.
The second, synthetic innovation, occurs when the firm combines existing
technologies and ideas in new and never previously done ways to create significantly
new products. Synthetic improvements usually set new standards in some way
for an existing product class and often result in sharp improvements in process
scope, volume, or capacity (Le., medium innovation steps). As a result, they are
associated with a medium level of potential cost, risk, and ROI.
The final level, discontinuous innovation, involves the creation of significantly
new technologies or ideas resulting in the development of previously non-existent
products (i.e., large innovation steps). Totally new process methods and technologies
are often required for product development and manufacture. Successful discontinuous
innovation may result in the creation of totally new products which may render
entire classes of products obsolete. Accordingly, discontinuous innovation is usually
associated with the highest potential level of product costs, risks, and ROI.

THE COMPETITIVE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGIES

To better understand the conditions under which simultaneous NPD and OPD efforts
could lead to improved product development success, it is necessary to explore
the competitive nature of technologies. In either NPD or OPD, product innovations
by themselves mayor may not lead to improved competitive success. For example,
while an individual innovation may be both highly original and creative, it may
not be considered successful if it satisfies a relatively limited customer demand.
An assessment of the competitive nature of products in terms of their form and
function as well as their production processes is required. For this purpose, Johnson's
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(l987)fra~ework is utilized to better vncterstand what he describes as base, key,
and pacing technologies.

Base.T~chnol~giesare common to the majority of industry competitors and their
products. As such, base techno}<?gies no longer fonn the primary basis of competitive
advantage for the firm. T~ey are most closely associated with old product
'redevelopment efforts aridcostIeadership strategies. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, pacing technoiogies:areoftenunavaiIabIe to the majority of industry
competitors. They are new:technologies, currently in the earliest stages of
.development, with the potential to iadically change the future basis of competitive
advantage. Pacing technologies are most closely associated with "pure" new product
..• development efforts and product differentiation strategies. Falling between base
and pacing technologies, key technologies are common to a small group of industry
competitors and their products, fornimg the immediate basis of competitive advantage
for these firms.
,

It is interesting to note that normal product evolution eventually results in pacing
technologies becoming key technologies and key technologies becoming base
technologies as product and process innovations evolve from the highly unique
and previously nonexistent to common and highly routine in nature. As these new,
more productive and cost effective technologies emerge, they are first adopted by
industry leaders and later, adopted by industry followers. This results in a
technological diffusion cycle whereby leading finns will continuously attempt to
push towards the next level of pacing technologies from key technologies and follower
, firms will push towards key technologies (often abandoned by leading firms) from
base technologies .

. ' THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY

Based on the foregoing, a 3X3 matrix interaction between innovation and technology
characteristics is proposed (see Figure 1). Within this framework, each of the
'technology categories (i.e., base, key, and pacing) represents the prevailing
competitive conditions for a product or line of products associated with each of
the levels of innovation (Le., incremental, synthetic, and discontinuous). As such,
the framework demonstrates that it is most likely that pacing technologies will emerge
from discontinuous innovation, but progressively less likely for pacing technologies
to emerge from synthetic or incremental innovation. Similarly, base technologies
are generally associated with incremental innovation but may also be associated
with synthetic or discontinuous levels of innovation as well.

FIGURE 1.
Product Innovation/Technology Framework:
Innovative/Positional Mode of the Firm
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Also represented in Figure 1 are the ways in which we may also classify the firm
as being either a leader or a follower in product innovation. Leaders introduce
new products into the marketplace to gain competitive advantage over rival
competitors. Leaders may be broad-span in nature and lead by introducing several
new products into related markets at the same time. Or, leaders may be narrow
span and lead by focussing entirely on introducing one (or a few) new products
into a specific market at a time. In contrast, followers can be classified as being
either committed or uncommitted positionals. Uncommitted positionals introduce
new products only in response to competitive pressure from innovative market leaders.
Committed positionals attempt to safeguard existing products from market leaders
primarily through manufacturing process innovation and cost cutting (Johne, 1987).

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
In examining matrix position 1-1, we find base technologies being designed and
produced under conditions of incremental innovation. This matrix position is strongly
associated with competitors who are industry followers in the uncommitted positional
mode. These competitors may be characterized as initiating a minimum level of
product development, engaging in incremental levels of operational and knowledge
technology innovation, and doing so only in response to competitive pressure from
market leaders. As a result, both the degree of risk of innovation and technology
failure in the marketplace are lower than at any other position within the matrix.

Matrix position 3-3 represents the direct opposite set of product development
conditions to position 1-1. Position 3-3 can be most strongly associated with
competitors who are narrow span industry leaders focussing entirely on introducing
one or a few major products into a specific market at a time. The technology
associated with this matrix position is often unavailable to the majority of industry
competitors forming the basis for future competitive advantage. Competitors in
this position normally engage in both discontinuous operational and knowledge
technology innovation. Products originating from this matrix position represent
the higpest possible degree of risk of innovation and technology failure among all
matrix positions. In contrast to matrix position 1-1, position 3-3 represents a high
level of short-term profitability risk, with the greatest long-term potential for improved
profitability and competitive advantage attainable by a firm.
Examining matrix positions 2-1 and 1-2, we find that finns in these positions can
be characterized as industry followers in the committed positional mode. These
firms attempt to safeguard existing base products through synthetic innovation (i.e.,
operational improvements) or to safeguard key technologies through incremental
innovation (i.e., overhead reduction). In both cases, cost reduction to maintain
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competitiveness is the primary objective. Product development in these matrix
positions may be characterized by a medium level of innovation risk and a low
level oftechnology risk (i.e., matrix position 2-1) or a low level of innovation risk
and a medium level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position 1-2). In either case,
a moderate level of profitability risk is tied to a medium level ROI.
Examining matrix positions 2-2, 2-3, and 3-2, we find that firms in these positions
can be characterized as broad-span industry leaders. These firms attempt to lead
by improving existing key technology products through either synthetic or
discontinuous innovation or attempt to introduce pacing technology products developed
through synthetic innovation. In all three cases, various combinations of product
cost reduction and product differentiation may be the primary objective. Product
development in these matrix positions is characterized by either medium levels
of innovation and technology risk i.e., matrix position 2-2), a high level of innovation
risk and medium level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position 3-2), or a medium
level of innovation risk and a high level of technology risk (i.e., matrix position
2-3). All three combinations carry a moderate degree of profitability risk tied to
medium to high levels of ROI.
The final two matrix positions, 3-1 and 1-3, represent the least likely, but not totally
improbable, innovation/technology positions. Similar to matrix positions 2-1 and
1-2, firms in positions 3-1 and 1-3 may be characterized as industry followers in
the committed positional mode. Firms in position 3-1 attempt to safeguard existing
base products through discontinuous innovation efforts in the form of sophisticated,
highly aggressive operational improvements. Firms with products in position 1-3
attempt to change the basis of competition through incremental innovation efforts
and highly aggressive overhead reduction designed to make pacing technology products
more affordable. In both cases, cost reduction to increase market share and
profitability are primary objectives.
Product development in position 3-1 is characterized by a high level of innovation
risk and a low level of technology risk. Alternately, product development in position
1-3 is characterized by a low level of innovation risk and a high level of technology
risk. In both positions, a moderate level of profitability risk tied to a medium level
of ROT exists.

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The increased emphasis on technological synergy may force many firms to reevaluate
how they manage their future product development activities. In response, Shrivastava
and Souder (1987) have defined a set of three technology phase transfer models
(Le., stage, process, and task-dominant models) for managing the product development
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~r~ess. A~raphic~eprese~tation of the po~itionirig of each technology phase transfer
model within the innovationltechllology framework appears in Figure 2.
· .The first of these models is. the stage~dominant model which is predominantly
·characterized by the. use of strong, .functionally specialized groups. In the
stage-dominaIlt model, predefined tasks are ,organized by function and performed
in "proper functional sequence" for greater projectefficiency. Product development
is often defined in terms of specific functional responsibilities and boundaries.
·This is supported by formal technology transfer" points between functions in the
product development process. As such, the stage-dominant model is most ideally
oriented towards the management of base technologies under conditions of incremental
innovation. However, it may also prove to .be effective for the management of
product development for base techIiologies . uIlder synthetic innovation or key
technologies under conditions of incremental innovation.
The second technology phase transfer model is the process-dominant model. In
this model, functional boundaries still exist but are reduced in importance. More
informal groupings of project team members as well as informal technology transfer
points exist between functions. Functional involvement and activities are continually
redefined. Product development is often specified in terms of the functional
interaction required to complete project tasks. This model is often thought of as
the compromise or transition between the stage and task-dominant models. The
process dominant model can be most closely associated with the management
of key teChnologies under conditions of incremental, synthetic, or discontinuous
innovation. However, it may also be associated with base technologies under
conditions of synthetic or even discontinuous innovation as well as pacing technologies
under synthetic or incremental innovation.
The third technology phase transfer model is the task-dominant model. This model
rejects all efforts to group project team members by functional area. Instead, product
development activities are defined and specified in terms of optimal task execution
and completion. The focus is generally on NPD effectiveness. This results in
continuous overlapping and blending of NPD efforts and communications between
team members. The task dominant model is most closely associated with the
. management of pacing technologies under discontinuous innovation. However,
it may be an effective approach for managing the development of key technologies
under conditions of discontinuous innovation or pacing technologies under synthetic
innovation.

FIGURE 2.
Product JnnovaNon/Technology Framework:
Technology Phase Transfer Model Positioning
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AN EXAMPLE: INTEL CORPORATION CPUS
To better understand the innovation/technology framework, let us consider the example
of Intel Corporation's computer central processor unit (CPU) business. Over the
past 10 years, Intel has established itself as the dominant computer CPU manufacturer
through a set of careful NPD and OPD strategies. These decisions have balanced
Intel's need for market leadership with its investor's need to harvest value from
their investment. Key to Intel's success has been the development of a clear strategy
which emphasizes when to continue to extend existing products lives while at the
same time pushing the development of new products.

If we examine Figure 3 in detail, Intel's product development strategy becomes
clear. Stage 1 in the life cycle of a CPU involves the development of a totally
new processor under conditions of discontinuous innovation utilizing pacing
technologies. A task dominant management model of the product development
process is utilized to guide the process. The marketing focus is on creating new
products which differentiate Intel from its competitors and firmly establishes its
dominance as the market leader in CPUs. This focus not only ensures Intel's influence
on PC hardware sales but has also ensured Intel's dominance over software
development directions. It has also had the effect of severely limiting the influence
of substitute product CPUs on the PC industry, thus not only controlling existing
software development directions but also future directions.
As a CPU "ages, Intel's competitors eventually gain access and the ability to
produce equivalent CPU technologies. Intel refocuses on the next generation of
CPU s and the current processor enters stage 2 of the product development process.
This stage is characterized by synthetic innovation using key technologies in which
further development activities attempt to differentiate the existing product class
from its competitors to retain the CPU's market leadership. The management process
gradually switches to a more process dominant format. As such, the original
processor's development path splits in three major directions: (1) an enhanced
processor design in which subtle refinements are made (e.g., DX2); (2) a faster
version of the existing processor design (e.g., DX replacement); and (3) a low
cost, reduced feature design of the existing processor (e.g., SX).
II

In the final stage of its life cycle, the processor becomes commonplace in nature
with all competitors having access to the same product and process technologies.
As the next generation of CPUs is released, the processor enters stage 3 of the
product development process. This stage is characterized by incremental innovation
using base technologies in which further development activities attempt to harvest
any and all remaining value from the product. The management process continues
to evolve to a stage dominant format. As such, the CPU's development path
concentrates primarily on developing faster versions of the processor. The focus

FIGURE 3.

Product Innovation/Technology Framework:
Intel Personal Computer CPU Example
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of the enhancement process is to improve efficiencies until the product is no longer
profitable. Finally, the product is abandoned altogether as further CPU developments
continue to reduce market demand.
From the foregoing, it is clear that mUltiple models of product development
throughout the life span of a product may be necessary. In addition, we propose
that the optimum product life cycle should closely follow the diagonal of the
framework matrix. That is, products are born in cell 3-3 , expand to their full market
potential and profitability in cell 2-2, and are managed to harvest all remaining
residual value in cell 1-1. The maximum degree of deviation from this diagonal
which is possible is governed by the competitive pressure applied on the firm by
the nature and rate of substitute product introductions. Therefore, in the case of
Intel previously discussed, we find that the high rate of technology deterioration
over time greatly limits the degree of possible deviation from the optimum product
development diagonal of cells.
Of further interest when examining this example is understanding how Intel's
competitors may implement product development strategies capable of breaking
Intel's dominance over the PC CPU industry. Two obvious strategies exist.
First, Intel's competitors may band together to develop an industry standard set
of processor operation rules which are open to all competitors' use. These rules
may be registered with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as ANSI
standards, for example. The CPU manufacturers may then provide options such
as financial support or technical assistance to major software development vendors
to create open standard products which are compatible with proprietary Intel based
software products. This would provide a more painless migration path to other
vendors' products, which would reduce resistance to brand switching.
The second option involves gaining the support of the primary PC operating system
vendor, Microsoft Corporation, in developing a processor independent operating
system. This option appears to be much closer to fruition in the recent release
and announcement by Microsoft that its new Windows NT operating system will
eventually run on all major processors. If this does indeed prove true, the potential
is great for far reaching change to the CPU industry'S basis of competition and
Intel's undisputed lead in processor development.

DISCUSSION

For the purposes of empirical verification, we propose the creation of a product
innovation index which not only measures the innovativeness of a product but is
also designed to measure its competitiveness. Such an index would be useful in
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understanding the competitive nature of existing products' successes or failures.
It would also be useful for the purpose of product prepositioning in terms of
identifying open market segments or in identifying areas where existing products
would be vulnerable to new product introductions by competitors.
Four key dimensions of product and process innovation may be used in the evaluation
of product development success. These dimensions include the machine, procedural,
instrumental knowledge, and conceptual knowledge technologies of the firm. The
machine and procedural technologies combine to create the firm's operational
technology base and the instrumental and conceptual knowledge technologies combine
to form its knowledge technology base. Operational technologies are defined as
the set of instruments (Le., machines) and procedures (i.e., production processes)
used by production operators to transform component and raw material inputs into
final product outputs. Knowledge technologies are defined as the firm's available
knowledge base (Le., human skills and experience) employed in inventing new
products, designing technical systems, or in performing the work itself (Shrivastava
and Souder, 1987).
Having developed a framework for categorizing and relating the nature of innovation
to technology, it becomes possible accurately to compare a firm's product and process
strengths to those of its major competitors. Utilizing the four key dimensions of
product and process innovation, an innovation index is proposed. This model seeks
to evaluate different competitors' products, existing in different positions within
the innovation/technology matrix, in a standardized manner, thereby making it possible
to "pre-position" new products more effectively in relation to those of competitors.
For purposes of future discussion we may now define the innovativeness of the
firm as,

where,
If(m)

=

If(p)

=

If(c)
If(k)

=
=

Innovativeness of Machine Technology
Innovativeness of Procedural Technology
Innovativeness ofInstrumental Knowledge Technology
Innovativeness of Conceptual Knowledge Technology

and each If(v) (f = firm 1, 2, 3, ... , x; v = innovation variable m, p, c, or k)
is a qualitative variable whose value may be equal to 1 (incremental innovation),
2 (synthetic innovation), or 3 (discontinuous innovation).
While providing a good initial basis for evaluation, further improvement to adjust
for changes in the basis of competition among industry competitors is required.
A technology adjustment variable, Tj(f(v» (i = industry 1, 2, 3, ... , y) must be
added to adjust for the competitive nature of technologies where Tj(f(v» represents
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a qualitative variable whose value may be equal to 1 (base technology), 2 (key
technology), or 3 (pacing technology). Substituting Ti(f(v» into I-Indexf results in
a revised index which may be stated as,
I-Indexi(f)

=

L

Ii(f(v»· Ti(f(v»

It is important to note that the innovativeness of the firm can not, in reality, be
measured solely by internal standards. Before launching a new product, its innovation
level must be measured and adjusted relative to competing firms at the same
technology level within an industry. Therefore, an innovation adjustment coefficient,
ai(f(v» is required for each innovation variable to adjust properly individual firm
innovation levels relative to competitors. By this scenario, an ai(f(v» = 1.0 indicates
the innovation assessment of the firm is accurate relative to its industry competitors.
In its basic form, the innovation adjustment coefficient, ai(f(v), may be calculated
as follows,
Ii(f(v))Actual
ai(f(v))

=
Ii(v))Average

Substituting <1j(f(v)) into I-Indexi(f)' we see that the industry adjusted product innovation
index, in its final form, may be expressed as,
I-Indexi(f)

=

L

ai(f(v»· [Ii(f(v» • Ti(f(v»l

We may further explore the behavior of the innovation adjustment coefficient,
ai(f(v», within the product innovation/technology framework (see Figure 4). Products
located within the diagonal of the matrix, extending from the upper right-hand comer
to lower left-hand comer, can be said to demonstrate a balanced strategy. That
is, a firm seeking to achieve: (1) a discontinuous level of innovation will utilize
a pacing level of technology; (2) a synthetic level of innovation will use a key level
of technology; and (3) an incremental level of innovation will use a base level of
technology. Thus, in all three cases, the resulting value of ai(f(v» will equal 1.0.
For products located in cells to the left of the diagonal of the matrix (Le., cells
2-1, 3-1, and 3-2) we propose that ai(f(v» will be less than one. This implies that
the true level of innovation of these products is less than the 1-Indexi(f) would otherwise
indicate. In contrast, products located in cells to the right of the diagonal of the
matrix (Le., cells 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3) will have an ai(f(v» value greater than 1.0.
As ai(f(v)) decreases to the left of the diagonal and increases to the right of the diagonal,
lower and upper innovation boundaries are formed indicating the outer limits at
which successful new product development may occur. In the case of the lower
boundary, further efforts to extend old product's lives are restricted by limited
innovation opportunities associated with base technologies. In the case of the upper
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boundary, further efforts to extend old product's lives through the use of pacing
technologies are restricted by incompatibilities between each succeeding generation
of technology. In both, the economics of extending old products' lives are directly
impacted by the pace at which product innovation occurs.

CONCLUSIONS
In closing, it is obvious that further research, in the form of empirical verification
of the innovation/technology framework will be required. Particularly, the concepts
related to the product development diagonals of the matrix, the movement of products
along the diagonal, and the measurement of the competitiveness of innovations located
within different matrix positions is required. However, we believe the framework
itself provides a sound initial basis from which to explore the relationship between
product innovation, the competitive nature of technologies, and product development
success or failure.
It is possible to draw three important conclusions related to the framework as
discussed within this paper. First, the product innovation index, I-Indexi(t), is a
composite score which reflects the potential competitiveness of a new product within
the marketplace. It is not, however, an absolute indicator of the ultimate success
of a new or revised product. In addition, while it is theoretically possible for two
competing products to achieve identical overall index scores, it is much less likely
that the individual innovation components comprising these scores will also be
identical. Therefore, it is equally important to look at the framework positioning
of individual components to gain a fuller understanding of the strategic implications
of a firm's product offerings. The strategic implications have been discussed earlier
in this paper.
Second, the framework provides an equal basis by which a firm may benchmark
its products against competitors' products to assess not only individual product
strategies but also to evaluate entire groups of product strategies. More importantly,
the regular benchmarking of competitors' products would allow for the continuous
monitoring of patterns of product development as an indicator of business strategy.
When extrapolated further, as in the case of Intel CPUs, the potential exists for
these strategy patterns to be used against major competitors in the form of "blocking"
moves designed to negate the strength of new product offerings. Such blocking
moves may include new or improved features, lower costs, revised marketing
strategies, and other actions timed to reduce the value of competing product offerings
within the marketplace.
Finally, because individual firm strategies, goals, and objectives will differ, so
too will their approaches to product development. Such a view recognizes that
it is possible to achieve competitive success via both new and/or old product
development efforts through proper product timing and positioning. Thus, while

ACR Vol. 2, No.1, 1994 19
narrow span leaders, characterized by discontinuous innovation using pacing
technology, have the greatest potential to change the basis of competition among
competitors as well as to capture entire portions of new markets, these same firms
also face the highest levels of technological and innovation risk in today's increasingly
global business environment. Alternately, firms engaged in the continuous
improvement of existing products often experience significantly reduced levels of
risk as well as a more immediate return on investment. Therefore, when properly
positioned in relation to competing products, sustained and highly significant levels
of success may be maintained by existing products for relatively long periods of
time.
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